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Abstract 
 
In the first meta-study on the finance-growth nexus, we bridge the gap between 
Schumpeterian authors and sympathizers of Andersen & Tarp (2003). Over 20 fundamental 
characteristics that have influenced the debate over the last decades are examined. The empirical 
evidence is based on 196 outcomes from 20 studies. For the investigated Andersen & Tarp 
hypotheses, while we find only partial support for their position on the lack of substantial 
empirical evidence on a positive finance-growth nexus, the stance that a negative nexus is 
characteristic of African and Latin American countries is strongly rejected. Schumpeter’s thesis 
might be wrong in our era because of:  endogeneity-based estimations, publication bias and, 
effects of financial activity. A historical justification is also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 As far as we have reviewed, one of the themes that have ignited great interest with intense 
debate and controversy among economic scholars and policy makers over the last decades is the 
finance-growth nexus. There is yet no definite consensus in theoretical and empirical literature on 
the relationship between financial development and economic growth
1
. While the first school 
pioneered by Schumpeter (1911) strongly advocates the positive rewards of financial 
development on growth, the recent financial crisis has resurfaced the ghost of the second school 
that is skeptical about the positive nexus.  
 Consistent with Schumpeter (1911), financial services are important for economic growth 
as long as they improve productivity by promoting technological innovation and helping 
entrepreneurs with the best chances of success in the innovation process.  He argued that 
financial development would facilitate the mobilization of productive savings, efficient resource 
allocation, reduce problems of information asymmetry and improve risk management. He further 
stressed that these effects could create a favorable macroeconomic framework for strong 
economic growth. This thesis has been strongly supported by a strand of endogenous growth 
models (King & Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2000).  
 Against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and global economic meltdown, it has 
become abundantly clear that financial development greatly penalizes economic growth in 
periods of financial crisis. An abundant literature has been consistent with the view that, the 
determining threshold remains the trade-off between financial instability and financial 
development in economic growth (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 
1998). While this skepticism is limited to the short-run (Loayza & Rancière, 2004; Eggoh, 2008), 
                                                 
1
 Lucas (1988) even rejects the role of finance on growth as ‘over-stressed’.  
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the positive impact of finance on growth is not sufficiently sustained by the literature (Andersen 
& Tarp, 2003). With a substantial backing of empirical literature (Gregorio & Guidotti, 1992; 
Ram, 1999; Luitel & Khan, 1999), Andersen & Tarp (2003) have strongly professed that, the 
positive association between finance and growth become negative when the sample is limited to 
Latin American and African countries
2
.  
This pattern has set the course for a recent short-run Schumpeterian trip to embryonic 
African monetary zones to assess the Schumpeterian thesis for positive spillovers of financial 
services on growth (Asongu, 2013a). A journey that has ended with mixed feelings because, 
while the trip has been promising for the East African Monetary Zone (EAMZ), it has been 
lamentable for the West African Monetary Zones (WAMZ). Results of the EAMZ (that are 
consistent with the traditional monetary policy arrangements) support the Schumpeterian thesis 
whereas, those of the WAMZ (in line with the non-traditional strand of regimes in which policy 
instruments in the short-run cannot be used of offset adverse shocks to output) are sympathetic 
with the Andersen & Tarp hypothesis.  
With the above interesting background, to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no 
meta-study that has addressed the underlying factors behind these conflicting results.  A meta-
study could tackle the heterogeneity of the finance-growth nexus by providing the much needed 
synthesis that will throw more light into the debate. In this study, we rigorously combine 
outcomes from several papers in order to take the debate to another platform. By attempting to 
bridge the gap between Schumpeterian authors and sympathizers of Andersen & Tarp (2003), this 
paper has a fivefold contribution to the literature. Firstly, as far as we have reviewed, it is the first 
meta-study on the nexus under consideration. Secondly, it assesses evidence of publication bias 
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The hypothesis of Andersen & Tarp (2003) was earlier initiated by Gregorio & Guidotti (1992) who found a 
negative finance-growth nexus for Latin American countries.  This thesis has been partially supported by many 
authors (Ram, 1999; Luitel & Khan, 1999).   
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hitherto unexamined in the finance-growth literature. Thirdly, it identifies fundamental 
characteristics that genuinely influence the nexus
3
. Fourthly, a corollary to the third contribution 
is the introduction of financial concepts of money and credit in the meta-examination of the 
linkage. Hence, we are able to assess whether money or credit matters for the direction of the 
nexus. Fifthly, it provides a twofold assessment of the Andersen & Tarp (2003) hypothesis
4
: on 
the one hand, the dimension of whether a negative finance-growth nexus is specific to African 
and Latin American countries is examined and; on the other hand, the position that the positive 
finance-growth nexus has not been sufficiently supported by empirical works is also investigated.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Data issues are discussed in Section 2. The 
empirical analysis and corresponding discussion are covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. Data  
2.1 Data collection process  
 Studies used in the meta-study are collected after an extensive search from April to June 
2011. ScienceDirect, Econlit, Econpapers, RePEc, Google Scholar and the classical Google 
search engine are cross-examined for relevant references. Regardless of methodological 
underpinnings, the base criterion for data collection is the finance-growth nexus.  Some papers 
are discarded due to the absence of empirical analysis with reported student (t) ratios or standard 
errors. This is the case of causality analysis. Some papers are simply put aside because their 
English versions could not be found. Of the 186 papers downloaded and examined, only 20 were 
retained based on the criteria discussed above.  
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 We comprehensively assess whether more than 20 fundamental characteristics in the finance-growth nexus have 
influenced research outcomes over the past decades: choice of financial development indicator (financial depth: 
money vs. financial activity: credit); estimation methodology (GMM vs. Least Squares); frequency of data (annual or 
otherwise)…etc 
4
 They have concluded that the positive impact of finance on growth is not sufficiently sustained by empirical works. 
“Turning to the empirical evidence, it is shown that the alleged first-order effect whereby financial development 
causes growth is not adequately supported by econometric work. The empirical evidence on the finance-growth 
nexus does not yield any clear-cut picture” (Andersen & Tarp, 2003; p.1).  
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 There is yet no clear consensus on the selection process of observations in meta-analysis. 
While some authors have preferred only one observation per study (Stanley, 2001), others have 
included all available estimates (Florax et al., 2005). Within the framework of this paper, we 
follow neither of the two approaches. Whether we collect all the available observations in a given 
paper depends on the differences in statistical significance. For instance, if a model is used for 
robustness purposes and corresponding results do not differ significantly from those of the initial 
model; only one set of observations is collected. This approach has a twofold justification: (1) it 
mitigates potential issues of overparametization and multicolinearity and; (2) it avoids data 
selection bias by over-representation of some studies. When a conflict of interest arises, values of 
the model with the highest coefficient of determination are collected. Consistent with the 
‘conceptual independence’ approach to meta-analysis, we neither reject ‘studies examined in 
different countries with the same methodology’ nor ‘studies devoted to a specific set of countries 
with different methodologies’.  
 Table 1 below summarizes the papers included in the meta-analysis with particular 
emphasis on the financial intermediary development dynamics encountered in the literature
5
. 196 
observations have been collected from the 20 retained studies.  
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At the beginning, we wanted to involve all the financial intermediary development dimensions identified by the 
Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB). These dimensions are consistent 
with recent finance literature (Asongu, 2013bc) and include: financial depth (liquid liabilities to GDP); financial 
allocation efficiency (Bank credit to Bank deposits); financial size (deposit bank assets on central bank assets) and 
financial activity (private domestic credit to GDP). Unfortunately as we reviewed the literature, we found very 
scanty evidence of studies that have employed measures of financial allocation efficiency and financial size. 
Restricting the selection process to financial depth and financial activity, we further discovered that there were three 
measures of financial activity: ratio of private credit to GDP, ratio of private credit to domestic credit and, ratio of 
domestic credit to GDP. All the three measures are collected because the last two do not pose any issues of over-
representation in terms of degrees of freedom (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Papers included in the Meta-Analysis  
Number Studies Number of Estimates 
  LL PRIVY DOMC PRIVATE Finance 
1 Christopoulos & Tsionas (2004) 11 -- --- --- 11 
2 Corporale et al. (_______) 4 -- --- --- 4 
3 Hassan  et al. (2011) 9 9 11 --- 29 
4 Loayza & Ranciere (2002) 1 -- --- 1 2 
5 Lu & Yao (2009) 3  --- 3 6 
6 Naceur & Ghazouani (2007) 6 6 --- --- 12 
7 Levine(1999) 6 6 --- 6 18 
8 Huang et al. (2010) 2 2 --- --- 4 
9 Shen & Lee (2006) 9 9 --- --- 18 
10 Liu & Hsu (2006) 6 6 --- --- 12 
11 Jalil et al. (2010) 2 2 --- --- 4 
12 Goaied  &  Sassi (2010) 8 8 --- --- 16 
13 Estrada et al. (2010) 4 4 --- --- 8 
14 Gondo (2009) 2 2 --- --- 4 
15 Favara (2003) 12 12 --- --- 24 
16 Kemal et al. (2008) 2 2 --- --- 4 
17 Barajas et al. (2010) --- 6 --- --- 6 
18 Claessens & Laeven (2002) --- 2 --- --- 2 
19 Gregorio & Guidott (1995) --- 12 --- --- 12 
20 Leitao (2010) -- 2 --- --- 2 
Total 87 90 11 10 196 
       
LL: Liquid Liabilities on GDP. PRIVY: Private Credit on GDP. DOMC: Domestic Credit on GDP. PRIVATE: Private Credit on Domestic Credit. 
 
 
2.2 Moderator variables  
 As shown in Table 2, we control for the unobserved heterogeneity and assess fundamental 
characteristics that genuinely affect the nexus under meta-investigation. These include: 
observable financial development dynamics, quality of the dependent variable, the econometric 
approach, data characteristics, regions and data sources. The choice of the fundamental 
characteristics is consistent with the motivations of the meta-study. For instance, financial and 
regional dynamics enable the assessment of the two dimensions of the Andersen & Tarp (2003) 
hypothesis. Ultimately, more than 20 relevant moderator variables are derived from the 6 
fundamental characteristics.  
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Table 2: List of moderator variables  
 Study Characteristics  Moderation variables  
  3 
 
 
1 
 
Financial Development Variables  
Liquid Liabilities on GDP  
Private Credit on GDP 
Domestic Credit on GDP  
Private Credit on Domestic Credit  
   
 
2 Quality of Dependent Variable   GDP Growth  (1=GDP, 0=otherwise)  
   
 
 
3 
 
Econometric Method  
Functional form (1=linear, 0=otherwise), 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise) 
Statistical  technique2 (1=GMM, 0=otherwise) 
Type of analysis (1=panel, 0=otherwise) 
   
 
4 
 
Data Characteristics  
Frequency of data (1=annual, 0=otherwise) 
Years (average year of study period) 
Data transformation 1 (1=log, 0=otherwise) 
Data transformation 2 (1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise) 
   
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
Regions  
Africa (1=Africa, 0=otherwise) 
Asia (1=Asia, 0=otherwise) 
Europe (1=Europe, 0=otherwise) 
Latin America (1=Latin America, 0=otherwise) 
North America (1=North America, 0=otherwise) 
Southeast Asia (1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise) 
Middle East (1=Middle East, 0=otherwise) 
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Data Sources 
World Bank (1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise) 
International Monetary F und (1=IMF information, 0=otherwise) 
United Nations (1=UN information, 0=otherwise) 
   
GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1 Assessing Publication Bias  
 Data collection has been based on the following baseline OLS specification
6
   
kkk xy   10                                                      (1) 
where y is the dependent variable representing growth, x is a measure of financial development 
and the k subscript represents the number of observations. However, basing our results on Eq. (1) 
is unfeasible and erroneous because the standard errors (se) and t-statistics are not directly 
comparable. Hence, the analysis of heterogeneity is typically the first step of data assessment in 
meta-analysis.  
 Heterogeneity consists of examining the extent to which beta coefficients in Eq. (1) differ 
from one another. Accordingly, we convert the estimated coefficients into their partial 
                                                 
6
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the predominant estimation technique in meta-analysis (see Card & Krueger, 
1995; Görg & Strol, 2001; Havranek & Irsova, 2010). 
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correlations. Owing to their unitless characteristics, partial correlations are ideal for comparing 
the finance-growth linkage across the literature under consideration. Consistent with the meta-
analysis literature (Doucouliagos et al., 2012; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012), the partial 
correlations (r) are computed from the t-statistics (t) and degrees of freedom (df) as shown in Eq. 
(2) below:  
)²( dft
t
r

                                                               (2) 
 A consistent bulk of the empirical literature examining the finance-growth nexus is 
characterized by substantial distortions in the magnitude of estimated effects, especially when 
studies report estimates toward a specific value. Hence, the possibility of selection or publication 
bias
7
. In accordance with the meta-analysis literature, failing to take this publication bias issue 
into account may lead to overstating the magnitude of the genuine effect.  
3.1.1 A simple graphical test 
 As shown in Figure 1 below, a scatter plot is presented to test for publication bias. 
Accordingly, a funnel-like symmetrical representation denotes the absence of publications bias. 
In the figure, while the horizontal axis presents the partial correlations of the estimated 
coefficients, the vertical axis shows the measurement of the precision. The most common 
measure of precision is the inverse of the standard error (INSE). The absence of the bias under 
consideration implies that the estimated effects are distributed symmetrically around the genuine 
effect or around zero when no genuine effect exists. Normally, studies with large (small) sample 
should result to more (less) precise estimates, implying smaller (larger) standard errors. Hence, 
less precise estimates at the bottom of the graph ought to be spread out more than precise ones at 
                                                 
7
 The “file drawer” problem occurs when researchers publish exclusively studies with significant results that are in 
line with mainstream theory because these findings have a high probability of being accepted for publication in 
academic journals. Therefore studies with a limited likelihood of publication are simply “filed” and kept in the 
“drawer”. Mainstream studies on meta-analysis have consistently underlined this issue (Card & Krueger, 1995; Görg 
& Strobl, 2001; Mookerjee, 2006). 
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the top of the graph. Consequently in the absence of bias, a scatter plot should resemble a 
symmetric funnel. 
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
-1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
R
IN
S
E
 
Figure 1: Funnel plot  
 
 From Figure 1 above, it could clearly be seen that the positive effects are over-reported 
which confirms the presence of a positive-effect bias. However, it should be noted that the funnel 
plot provides only indications and not definite evidence. Therefore, the positive-publication bias 
may be attributed to other factors. It is thus important to assess bias beyond diagrammatic 
representations.  
3.1.2 Funnel Asymmetry test  
The most documented formal analysis for publication bias is the “Funnel Asymmetry 
Test” (FAT) developed by Egger al. (1997). The test is based on the following regression:  
kkk sec   10                                                      (3) 
 where c stands for the estimated coefficient of the financial development variable on 
growth and, se are the standard errors corresponding to the estimated coefficients. In the absence 
of bias in the finance-growth literature, the estimated effects are not related to the corresponding 
standard errors. Testing for the significance of the constant term is traditionally regarded as the 
Precision Effect Test (PET) because the effects should be randomly distributed around the 
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(constant). Accordingly, the estimated coefficient corresponding to the standards errors should 
tend toward zero as the size of the sample increases. Hence, a significant effect of the coefficient 
corresponding to the standard errors is evidence of publication bias.  
Inferences based on FAT are invalid because the estimated effects collected from the 
finance-growth nexus literature are not directly comparable. An issue which can be addressed 
with the use of partial correlations and corresponding standard errors:  
kkk ser   10                                                      (4) 
where r is the partial correlation of the estimated effect of c, se is the corresponding standard 
error of  r and u is the error term. Unfortunately, Eqs. (3) and (4) suffer from heteroscedasticity. 
To avoid misleading inferences, we divide the Eq. (4) with the corresponding standard errors. 
Hence the new equation becomes: 
k
k
k
se
r  
1
* 01                                                     (5) 
 The asterisk on the dependent variable means that the ratios (partial correlations) have 
been divided by the corresponding standard errors.  This slight modification does not change the 
inference because; there is still a constant effect and a genuine effect. Since estimation by simple 
OLS could lead to biased estimates due to potential correlation among estimates within one 
study, we also estimate with cluster robust (CR) standard errors as reported in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3 : Funnel Asymmetry Test  
        
 Intercept 
( 1 ) 
1/SEr 
( 0 ) 
Asjusted 
R² 
Fisher Studies 
(j) 
Obs 
(n) 
Testing 
22   
OLS 12.957*** -0.143*** 0.206 51.849*** 20 196 P-value 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000) 
OLS-CR 12.957*** -0.143 0.206 2.305 20 196 P-value  
 (0.000) (0.130)  (0.130)   (0.000) 
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. CR: Cluster Robust. Obs: observations.  P-values in brackets.   
 
 Table 3 above shows findings of the FAT. The results broadly indicate the presence of 
publication bias because the intercept is statistically significant in both specifications. As we 
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move from the OLS to the OLS-CR specification, evidence of the genuine effect disappears. 
However the finding at this level is not definite because previous research has shown that, in 
cases with unexplained heterogeneity, FAT and PET results may be misleading (Stanley, 2008). 
We justify the presence of unexplained heterogeneity by testing the hypothesis that the variance 
of the error term is less or equal to 2 (see last column). The null hypothesis for the absence of 
unexplained heterogeneity is strongly rejected. Hence, the need to control for this unexplained 
heterogeneity using moderation variables in a meta-regression analysis.  
 
3. 2 Meta-analysis  
 The purpose of the meta-analysis is to reveal the specific factors that affect the reported 
values. While some factors may contribute to publication bias, others contribute to the genuine 
effect. Since factors accounting for publication bias are by nature highly correlated with those 
contributing the genuine effect, we limit moderator variables to the latter effect for three main 
reasons: (1) we have already substantially covered the issue of publication bias; (2) the genuine 
effect of finance-specific factors is consistent with the motivation of the study and; (3) in 
accordance with the conclusion of the previous section, the moderator variables for the genuine 
effect are used to explained the unobserved heterogeneity. The choice of the moderator variables 
has already been substantially documented in the data section.  
k
k
ik
K
k
k
k
k
se
M
se
r   

11
*
1
01                            (6)
  
 The findings in Table 4 below are based on Eq. (6) above. The use of two specifications 
has a twofold justification: on the one hand, it enables us to mitigate the three main issues of 
overparametization and multicolinearity (see green figures of the correlation analysis in 
Appendix 1); on the other hand, it is a means of robustness check.  From the cluster robust OLS 
estimations, the following findings can be established. (1) The significant intercept indicates 
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evidence of publication bias whereas the significant estimate corresponding to the ‘1/se’ beta 
variable shows evidence of a genuine effect. (2) The incorporation of financial depth (liquid 
liabilities) and domestic credit influences a positive finance-growth nexus while the addition of 
private credit (in GDP or domestic credit terms) is favorable to a negative finance-growth nexus. 
(3) While the use of OLS may lead to a positive nexus, when the issue of endogeneity is 
addressed (with GMM), the nexus becomes negative. (4) Data transformation in logarithm (ratio 
of GDP) significantly influences a positive (negative) relationship. (5) Contrary to Andersen & 
Tarp (2003), the inclusion of Latin American and African countries significantly improve a 
positive finance-growth nexus.  (6) With the exception of North America and slight exception of 
Europe, the inclusion of Asian, South East Asian and Middle East countries also significantly 
improve the partial coefficient correlations. (7) While data from the World Bank increases the 
possibility of a positive relationship, those from the IMF are favorable to a negative nexus and 
data from the UN has not effect.  
 Two important findings are worth noting for the assessed Andersen & Tarp (2003) 
hypotheses. On the one hand, we find only partial support for the postulation that, the positive 
finance-growth nexus has not been sufficiently backed by recent empirical literature. On the other 
hand, we do not find any backing for the thesis that, African and Latin American countries are 
characteristic of the negative nexus.  
  
3.3 Further discussion of results  
 We now devote more space to discussing the position of the Schumpeterian thesis of 
positive spillovers of financial services on growth. This discussion will be categorized in two 
strands: an empirical explanation and a historical perspective. 
 Three points are worth discussing from the empirical perspective: endogeneity-based 
evidence, the relevance of publication bias and genuine effects of the finance moderator 
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variables. Firstly, we have noticed that, estimation techniques (GMM) that take the endogeneity 
concern into account lead to results with a negative finance-growth nexus and those (OLS for 
instance) that do not take it into account lead to a positive finance-growth nexus. This leads us to 
infer that Schumpeter might be wrong when endogeneity is taken into account.  Secondly, as we 
have already seen above, there is substantial evidence of publication bias in which insignificant 
(or negative) finance-growth nexus papers are simply not sent out for publication because of their 
low probabilities of being accepted in academic journals. It follows that, many manuscripts that 
have not met some criteria of the Schumpeterian finance-growth conception have substantially 
suffered from the ‘file drawer’ problem and are unrepresented in the literature. Thirdly, based on 
the genuine effects of the selected financial variables, we have observed that financial activity 
(private domestic credit) genuinely decreases evidence of a positive finance-growth nexus. 
Financial depth (liquid liabilities) that reflects a positive nexus is not as important as financial 
activity because the former is a simple measure of financial system deposits or an extensive use 
of currency (Money Supply) that may not necessarily transit via the banking sector (in 
developing countries).  
From a historical perspective, it is important to first of all recall that proponents of a 
negative finance-growth nexus have sustained that financial development greatly penalizes 
economic growth in periods of financial meltdown. Therefore the determining threshold remains 
the trade-off between financial instability and financial development in economic growth 
(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). With this interesting 
background, it could be inferred that, at Schumpeter’s time8 the detrimental effect of financial 
instability on economic growth was less severe than what we are currently witnessing today. To 
put this fact into perspective: “the modern era of globalization has been associated with 
                                                 
8
 Schumpeter, J. (1911). The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA, Havard University Press. 
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significant economic transformation around the world, but also an increasing frequency of 
financial crises. According to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) there were 39 national or 
international financial crises between 1945 and 1973. Their frequency increased from 139 
between 1973 and 1997, culminating in the Asian financial crisis” (Buckle, p.36). Therefore it is 
only logical to infer that Schumpeter might be wrong in our time. The argument can further be 
buttressed by the evidence that characteristics of financial crisis run counter to the Schumpeterian 
thesis. The presence of financial instability decreases favorable macroeconomic conditions for a 
strong economic growth: easy mobilization of productive savings, efficient resource allocation, 
reduction of information asymmetry and, improvement of risk management (Schumpeter, 1911).  
 
4. Conclusion  
In the first meta-study on the finance-growth nexus, we have bridged the gap between 
Schumpeterian authors and sympathizers of Andersen & Tarp (2003). Over 20 fundamental 
characteristics that have influenced the debate over the last decades have been examined. The 
empirical evidence is based on 196 outcomes from 20 studies. For the investigated Andersen & 
Tarp hypotheses, while we have found only partial support for their position on the lack of 
substantial empirical evidence on a positive finance-growth nexus, the stance that a negative 
nexus is characteristic of African and Latin American countries has been strongly rejected. 
Schumpeter’s thesis might be wrong in our era because of:  endogeneity-based estimations, 
publication bias and, effects of financial activity. A historical justification has also been 
discussed. 
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Table 4: Results of meta-regression using partial correlations coefficients  
  
 Response variable: partial correlations of the observed effect 
 1st Specification 2nd Specification 
   
Intercept ( 1 ) 
17.99*** 11.948* 1061.07 1039.15* 271.388 8.327** 24.167*** 984.41 967.63 -106.408 
 (0.005) (0.082) (0.102) (0.090) (0.722) (0.044) (0.007) (0.135) (0.116) (0.888) 
1/SEr ( 0 ) 
-0.153 -0.146 -0.147 -0.170** -0.153* -0.153 -0.146 -0.149 -0.179 -0.162** 
 (0.108) (0.102) (0.127) (0.044) (0.060) (0.108) (0.107) (0.126) (0.024) (0.041) 
[Finance: LL on GDP]/SEr 10.349** 9.588** 5.109 4.469 6.083* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.197) (0.157) (0.058)      
[Finance: Priv. Credit on GDP]/SEr --- --- --- --- --- -10.349** -9.594** -4.839 -4.460 -6.495* 
      (0.010) (0.017) (0.221) (0.192) (0.062) 
[Finance: Dom. Credit on GDP ]/SEr 18.78*** 11.503** 13.82** 0.524 4.106 8.434** 1.838 10.413* -0.629 -1.186 
 (0.005) (0.040) (0.039) (0.943) (0.473) (0.046) (0.628) (0.061) (0.923) (0.762) 
[Finance: Priv. Credit on Dom. Credit 
]/SEr 
-9.575 -14.199 -12.891 -7.697 -7.807 -19.92*** -24.01*** -17.200** -11.630 -11.213* 
 (0.265) (0.111) (0.169) (0.357) (0.280) (0.009) (0.003) (0.030) (0.132) (0.067) 
[Dependent variable(GDP=1, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- 0.822 12.909* -1.832 -5.335 --- 0.856 11.150 -2.804 -6.262 
  (0.865) (0.083) (0.827) (0.744)  (0.859) (0.138) (0.727) (0.720) 
[Statistical technique1(1=least squares, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 22.706*** 35.937*** 54.875*** 46.802*** 
       (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
[Statistical technique2 (1=GMM, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- -24.4*** -42.7*** -66.23*** -59.69*** --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
[Type of analysis(1=panel, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- 7.914 4.597 -6.683 --- --- 1.237 -3.772 -20.000** 
   (0.326) (0.425) (0.394)   (0.877) (0.566) (0.032) 
[Data frequency(1=annual, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- 19.43*** 11.611* 14.342** --- --- 18.471*** 10.314 13.750* 
   (0.003) (0.079) (0.046)   (0.006) (0.114) (0.080) 
[Years(average years of study)] /SEr --- --- 0.562 0.559* 0.151 --- --- 0.509 0.500 -0.068 
   (0.114) (0.093) (0.715)   (0.161) (0.137) (0.868) 
[Data transformation 1(1=log, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- 22.097** 22.06*** 37.63*** --- --- 16.800** 11.455 32.343*** 
   (0.011) (0.007) (0.000)   (0.037) (0.152) (0.000) 
[Data transformation 2(1=GDP, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- -20.71** -29.48*** -30.7*** --- --- -21.386** -29.28*** -32.36*** 
   (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
[Africa (1=Africa,0=otherwise)]/SEr --- --- --- 2.511 -7.340 --- --- --- 15.671** 0.353 
    (0.639) (0.338)    (0.047) (0.968) 
[Asia (1=Asia, 0=otherwise)]/SEr --- --- --- 16.01*** 25.31*** --- --- --- 13.873*** 27.422*** 
    (0.000) (0.002)    (0.006) (0.000) 
[Europe (1=Euro, 0=otherwise)]/SEr --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5.213 14.237* 
         (0.492) (0.060) 
[Latin America (1=Latin America, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- --- 29.68*** 34.39*** --- --- --- 24.953*** 31.812*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)    (0.001) (0.000) 
[North America (1=North America, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- --- 8.367 13.590 --- --- --- --- --- 
    (0.497) (0.211)      
[South East Asia(1=South East Asia, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- --- 15.61** 22.605** --- --- --- 15.06** 24.602*** 
    (0.025) (0.015)    (0.0371) (0.009) 
[Middle East (1=Middle East, 
0=otherwise)]/SEr 
--- --- --- 62.52*** 48.45*** --- --- --- 52.246*** 38.630** 
    (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
[Dummy=1 if Information is from the 
World Bank] /SEr 
--- --- --- --- 21.583* --- --- --- --- 28.553** 
     (0.083)     (0.023) 
[Dummy=1 if Information is from the 
IMF]/SEr 
--- --- --- --- -22.36*** --- --- --- --- -25.07*** 
     (0.001)     (0.003) 
[Dummy=1 if Information is from the 
United Nations]/SEr 
--- --- --- --- -0.569 --- --- --- --- 6.388 
     (0.935)     (0.431) 
Adjusted R² 0.223 0.292 0.349 0.573 0.608 0.223 0.285 0.333 0.521 0.569 
Fisher 5.002*** 3.42*** 6.705*** 15.001*** 13.903*** 5.002*** 3.512*** 5.943*** 7.154*** 8.388*** 
Number of studies  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of Observations  196 196 195 195 195 196 196 195 195 195 
Notes: *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. LL: Liquid Liabilities. Priv. Private. Dom: Domestic. Euro: Europe.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Correlation Analysis (Potential overparametization and multicolinearity issues highlighted in green colour) 
                        
Financial Development Moderation Variables R.V  
LL P D P/D D.V ST1 ST2 ToA Freq Yrs Log GDP Afri Asia Euro LA NA SEA ME WB IMF UN r  
1.00 -.82 -.19 -.20 .09 -.03 .02 -.18 .23 .11 .03 -.01 .05 .006 .07 .08 .02 -.005 .03 -.14 .04 -.10 .02 LL 
 1.00 -.20 -.21 -.11 -.06 .05 .07 .12 -.18 .06 -.01 .01 -.11 -.04 -.10 .01 -.06 .02 .21 .09 -.05 -.001 P 
  1.00 -.05 .02 .13 -.12 .12 -.22 .22 -.11 .03 -.08 .17 .03 .01 -.01 .22 -.02 -.24 -.33 .48 .04 D 
   1.00 .02 .08 -.08 .12 -.05 -.07 -.11 .03 -.08 .09 -.10 .01 -.08 -.04 -.10 .06 .00 -.10 -.09 P/D 
    1.00 -.06 .05 -.05 -.09 .01 .05 -.01 .03 .04 .04 .03 .03 .09 .04 .11 .15 -.22 -.01 D.V 
     1.00 -.94 -.22 -.36 -.05 -.38 -.08 -.45 .26 .14 .10 .23 .11 -.61 -.26 -.09 .27 .29 ST1 
      1.00 .31 .33 .06 .41 .08 .34 -.25 -.12 -.09 -.22 -.11 .65 .22 .07 -.25 -.30 ST2 
       1.00 -.15 .11 -.17 -.07 -.11 -.18 .24 -.17 .21 .04 .24 .43 -.25 .24 -.07 ToA 
        1.00 .22 .01 .14 .25 .08 .23 .04 .25 -.14 .22 .01 .13 -.32 .08 Freq 
         1.00 -.31 .17 -.08 .38 .25 -.20 .12 .16 .08 -.27 -.60 .38 -.02 Yrs 
          1.00 .07 .39 -.22 -.23 -.16 -.20 -.10 .31 -.13 .34 -.23 -.02 Log 
           1.00 .05 .06 .06 .04 .05 .02 .06 -.12 -.09 .06 -.02 GDP 
            1.00 -.16 -.16 -.11 -.14 -.07 .50 .30 .11 -.17 .05 Afri 
             1.00 -.07 -.13 -.04 -.08 -.18 -.49 -.26 .25 .09 Asia 
              1.00 -.13 .86 -.08 -.19 0.11 .10 .17 .06 Euro 
               1.00 -.11 .03 -.13 -.12 .08 .006 .07 LA 
                1.00 -.07 -.16 .24 .15 .11 .32 NA 
                 1.00 -.08 -.21 -.23 .35 .03 SEA 
                  1.00 .29 -.17 -.08 .10 ME 
                   1.00 .20 -.39 .10 WB 
                    1.00 -.56 -.13 IMF 
                     1.00 .10 UN 
                      1.00 r 
                        
LL: Liquid Liabilities on GDP. P: Private Credit on GDP. D: Domestic Credit on GDP. P/D: Private Credit on Domestic Credit. ST1: Statistical Technique 1. ST2: Statistical Technique 2.  ToA: Type of 
Analysis.  Freq: Data Frequency. Yrs: Average year of study. Log: Data transformation in logarithm. GDP: Data transformation in GDP. Afri: Africa. Euro: Europe. LA: Latin America. NA: North 
America. SEA: South East Asia. ME: Middle East. WB: World Bank.  IMF: International Monetary Fund. UN: United Nations. r: Partial correlations of the observed effect. R.V: Response Variable.  All 
the variables are in ratios of Standard errors.  
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Appendix 2: Data collection summary  
Studies A: LLY B:PrivcreditY C:DomcreditY  D:(B/C) E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 3.21 (3.00)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 51.5 (4.33)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 40.3 (3.14)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 3.08 (1.62)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 18.5 (1.50)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 30.4 (3.76)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 36.5 (3.72)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 83.1 (1.68)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 25.4 (3.28)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 39.1 (3.83)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.09 
Christopoulos & T.(2004) 14.1 (2.57)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1985 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 17.2 
Corporale et al.(_____) 0.01 (2.42)       1 1 0 1 1 1 2000 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 11.31 
Corporale et al.(_____) 0.00 (2.10)       1 1 0 1 1 1 2000 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.61 
Corporale et al.(_____) 0.00 (2.44)       1 1 0 1 1 1 2000 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5.47 
Corporale et al.(_____) 0.00 (1.81)       1 1 0 1 1 1 2000 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.00 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   1.20 (2.06)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6.55 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -0.07 (-0.10)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5.91 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   0.68 (1.83)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.00 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   0.58 (1.20)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.00 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -0.77 (-0.65)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.58 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -0.38 (-1.11)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.74 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -0.57 (-2.11)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 10.95 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -3.17 (-2.36)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.41 
Hassan  et al. (2011)   -0.40 (-1.29)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 24.63 
Hassan  et al. (2011) 1.30 (1.64)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6.55 
Hassan  et al. (2011) -2.1 (-2.58)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.00 
Hassan  et al. (2011) 0.12 (0.18)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.00 
Hassan  et al. (2011) 0.68 (0.44)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.09 
Hassan  et al. (2011) -1.28 (-0.55)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4.47 
Hassan  et al. (2011) 0.34 (0.60)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.74 
Hassan  et al. (2011) -1.78 (-3.17)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 10.95 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     -1.99 (-1.47)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.28 
Hassan  et al. (2011) -1.07 (-2.48)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 24.51 
Loayza & Ranciere(2002) 2.08 (11.4)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 18.60 
Loayza & Ranciere(2002)   1.43 (22.69)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 18.60 
Lu & Yao(2009) -0.690 (-0.40)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.82 
Lu & Yao(2009) 1.031 (0.93)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.67 
Lu & Yao(2009) 0.914 (0.81)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.61 
Lu & Yao(2009)       -0.757 (-0.14) 1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.82 
Lu & Yao(2009)       -1.578 (-0.43) 1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.67 
Lu & Yao(2009)       -3.032 (-0.93) 1 1 1 0 1 1 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.61 
A: Liquid Liabilities/GDP, B: Private Credit/GDP, C:Domestic Credit/GDP, D: Private/Domestic Credit, E: Dependent variable(1=GDP, 0=otherwise), F:Functional form(1=linear, 0=otherwise), G: 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise), H:Statistical  technique2(1=GMM, 0=otherwise), I:Type of analysis(1=panel, 0=otherwise), J: Frequency of data(1=annual, 0=otherwise), 
K:Years(average year of study period), L: Data transformation(1=log, 0=otherwise), M:Data transformation(1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise), N:Africa(1=Africa, 0=otherwise), O:Asia(1=Asia, 
0=otherwise), P(1=Europe, 0=otherwise), Q:Latin America(1=Latin America, 0=otherwise), R: North America(1=North America, 0=otherwise), S:Southeast Asia(1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise), 
T(1=Middle East, 0=otherwise), U: World Bank information(1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise), V: IMF information(1=IMF information, 0=otherwise), W:UN information(1=UN 
information, 0=otherwise), X: Size (Squared root of degrees of freedom). Values in brackets () after extrapolated coefficients are student statistics. 
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Appendix 3: Data collection summary (continued 1) 
Studies A: LLY B:PrivcreditY C:DomcreditY  D:(B/C) E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.291 (-3.30)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.264 (-2.83)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.248 (-2.98)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   0.009 (0.06)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   -0.047 (-0.25)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   -0.126 (-0.75)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 7.348 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.226 (-3.37)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.209 (-3.02)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007) -0.197 (-2.98)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   -0.049 (-0.50)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   -0.026 (-0.26)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Naceur & Ghazouani(2007)   -0.067 (-0.67)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1991 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9.165 
Levine(1999) 0.087 (3.28)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.831 
Levine(1999) 0.074 (1.62)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.745 
Levine(1999)       0.137 (7.56) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.899 
Levine(1999)       0.138 (6.04) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.899 
Levine(1999) 0.68 (4.27)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.916 
Levine(1999) 0.37 (2.22)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.831 
Levine(1999)       0.104 (6.64) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.000 
Levine(1999)       0.093 (4.02) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.000 
Levine(1999) 0.003 (0.24)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.164 
Levine(1999) 0.004 (0.38)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.083 
Levine(1999)       0.084 (4.27) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.657 
Levine(1999)       0.082 (3.35) 1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.657 
Huang et al.(2010) 2.261 (2.46)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Huang et al.(2010) 2.598 (2.91)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Huang et al.(2010)   2.479 (2.55)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Huang et al.(2010)   2.555 (2.81)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.019 (-4.24)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.59 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.012 (-4.87)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.05 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.014 (-3.21)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 28.74 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.019 (-3.84)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.62 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.020 (-4.07)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.09 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.013 (-2.74)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 30.80 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.068 (-7.02)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.59 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.072 (-7.15)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.05 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.052 (-5.49)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 28.74 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.053 (-7.37)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.62 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.057 (-7.71)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.09 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.039 (-5.75)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 30.80 
A: Liquid Liabilities/GDP, B: Private Credit/GDP, C:Domestic Credit/GDP, D: Private/Domestic Credit, E: Dependent variable(1=GDP, 0=otherwise), F:Functional form(1=linear, 0=otherwise), G: 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise), H:Statistical  technique2(1=GMM, 0=otherwise), I:Type of analysis(1=panel, 0=otherwise), J: Frequency of data(1=annual, 0=otherwise), 
K:Years(average year of study period), L: Data transformation(1=log, 0=otherwise), M:Data transformation(1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise), N:Africa(1=Africa, 0=otherwise), O:Asia(1=Asia, 
0=otherwise), P(1=Europe, 0=otherwise), Q:Latin America(1=Latin America, 0=otherwise), R: North America(1=North America, 0=otherwise), S:Southeast Asia(1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise), 
T(1=Middle East, 0=otherwise), U: World Bank information(1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise), V: IMF information(1=IMF information, 0=otherwise), W:UN information(1=UN 
information, 0=otherwise), X: Size(Squared root of degrees of freedom). Values in brackets () after extrapolated coefficients are student statistics. 
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Appendix 4:  Data Collection Summary (continued 2) 
Studies A: LLY B:PrivcreditY C:DomcreditY  D:(B/C) E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     1.17 (2.01)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7.07 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     -1.48 (-1.52)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6.55 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     0.07 (0.15)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.31 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     1.53 (2.42)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5.74 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     0.74 (2.24)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5.19 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     0.04 (0.13)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11.83 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     -1.32 (-3.66)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 11.26 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     -1.49 (-1.30)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7.74 
Hassan  et al. (2011)     -0.42 (-1.55)   1 1 1 0 1 0 1994 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 24.65 
Levine(1999)   0.13 (5.19)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.91 
Levine(1999)   0.08 (2.70)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5.83 
Levine(1999)   0.08 (3.69)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.08 
Levine(1999)   0.04 (2.54)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.00 
Levine(1999)   0.03 (2.10)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.70 
Levine(1999)   0.03 (2.19)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.63 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.028 (-4.88)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.59 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.033 (-5.42)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 29.05 
Shen & Lee(2006) -0.021 (-4.1)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 28.74 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.033 (-5.54)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.62 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.036 (-5.93)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 31.09 
Shen & Lee(2006)   -0.022 (-4.29)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1988 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 30.80 
Liu & Hsu (2006) -3.708 (-1.60)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006) -0.985 (-0.38)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006) 0.413 (0.24)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006) -1.223 (-1.14)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006) 18.58 (5.43)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006) 24.07 (7.52)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   0.071 (0.045)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   -1.071 (-0.64)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   -15.35 (-12.41)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   -9.126 (-6.26)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   -33.41 (-8.59)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Liu & Hsu (2006)   -35.83 (-11.33)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1991 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4.123 
Jalil et al.(2010) 0.965 (2.314)       1 1 0 0 0 1 1986 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.245 
Jalil et al.(2010) 2.589 (3.572)       1 1 0 0 0 1 1986 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.164 
Jalil et al.(2010)   0.587 (3.654)     1 1 0 0 0 1 1986 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.245 
Jalil et al.(2010)   0.234 (6.585)     1 1 0 0 0 1 1986 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6.164 
Barajas et al.(2010)   0.007 (2.512)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.899 
Barajas et al.(2010)   0.006 (2.125)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.592 
Barajas et al.(2010)   0.017 (4.181)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 25.37 
Barajas et al.(2010)   0.010 (2.148)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 24.18 
A: Liquid Liabilities/GDP, B: Private Credit/GDP, C:Domestic Credit/GDP, D: Private/Domestic Credit, E: Dependent variable(1=GDP, 0=otherwise), F:Functional form(1=linear, 0=otherwise), G: 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise), H:Statistical  technique2(1=GMM, 0=otherwise), I:Type of analysis(1=panel, 0=otherwise), J: Frequency of data(1=annual, 0=otherwise), 
K:Years(average year of study period), L: Data transformation(1=log, 0=otherwise), M:Data transformation(1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise), N:Africa(1=Africa, 0=otherwise), O:Asia(1=Asia, 
0=otherwise), P(1=Europe, 0=otherwise), Q:Latin America(1=Latin America, 0=otherwise), R: North America(1=North America, 0=otherwise), S:Southeast Asia(1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise), 
T(1=Middle East, 0=otherwise), U: World Bank information(1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise), V: IMF information(1=IMF information, 0=otherwise), W:UN information(1=UN 
information, 0=otherwise), X: Size(Squared root of degrees of freedom). Values in brackets () after extrapolated coefficients are student statistics. 
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Appendix 5: Data Collection Summary (continued 3) 
Studies A: LLY B:PrivcreditY C:DomcreditY  D:(B/C) E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 
Claessens & Laeven(2002)   -0.021 (-1.30)     0 1 1 0 1 1 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 35.17 
Claessens & Laeven(2002)   0.049 (3.23)     0 1 1 0 1 1 1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28.63 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -4.552 (-1.54)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 19.07 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -2.342 (-0.72)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 19.07 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -5.116 (-3.35)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 19.07 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -4.865 (-6.62)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 19.07 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -0.557 (-0.32)       1 1 0 1 1 0 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 8.185 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -0.101 (-0.12)       1 1 0 1 1 0 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 8.185 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -3.371 (-2.03)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 8.185 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -3.006 (-3.29)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 8.185 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -9.414 (-3.06)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.19 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) -8.564 (-1)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.19 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -5.299 (-2.9)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.19 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   -15.70 (-0.47)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.19 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) 2.834 (0.96)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.49 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010) 5.522 (0.3)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.49 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   1.795 (0.7)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.49 
Goaied  &  Sassi(2010)   28.158 (1.9)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1984 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 13.49 
Estrada et al.(2010) 2.792 (3.736)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.41 
Estrada et al.(2010) 2.554 (2.017)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Estrada et al.(2010) 2.036 (2.425)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Estrada et al.(2010) 2.756 (3.694)       1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Estrada et al.(2010)   1.772 (3.06)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.41 
Estrada et al.(2010)   1.299 (1.71)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Estrada et al.(2010)   1.586 (2.39)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Estrada et al.(2010)   1.812 (3.14)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1997 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19.39 
Gondo (2009) -0.194 (-1.70)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.899 
Gondo (2009) -0.409 (-1.96)       1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.899 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.018 (2.3)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.274 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.024 (3.58)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.274 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.015 (1.74)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.937 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.01 (1.71)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9.274 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.044 (2.16)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.796 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.054 (2.77)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.796 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.048 (2.39)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.796 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   0.135 (3.62)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4.796 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   -0.092 (-3.2)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1967 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   -0.104 (-3.83)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1967 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   -0.041 (-0.72)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1962 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
Gregorio & Guidott (1995)   -0.027 (-0.52)     1 1 1 0 1 0 1962 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7.416 
A: Liquid Liabilities/GDP, B: Private Credit/GDP, C:Domestic Credit/GDP, D: Private/Domestic Credit, E: Dependent variable(1=GDP, 0=otherwise), F:Functional form(1=linear, 0=otherwise), G: 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise), H:Statistical  technique2(1=GMM, 0=otherwise), I:Type of analysis(1=panel, 0=otherwise), J: Frequency of data(1=annual, 0=otherwise), 
K:Years(average year of study period), L: Data transformation(1=log, 0=otherwise), M:Data transformation(1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise), N:Africa(1=Africa, 0=otherwise), O:Asia(1=Asia, 
0=otherwise), P(1=Europe, 0=otherwise), Q:Latin America(1=Latin America, 0=otherwise), R: North America(1=North America, 0=otherwise), S:Southeast Asia(1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise), 
T(1=Middle East, 0=otherwise), U: World Bank information(1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise), V: IMF information(1=IMF information, 0=otherwise), W:UN information(1=UN 
information, 0=otherwise), X: Size(Squared root of degrees of freedom). Values in brackets () after extrapolated coefficients are student statistics.  
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Appendix 6: Data Collection Summary (continued 4) 
Studies A: LLY B:PrivcreditY C:DomcreditY  D:(B/C) E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 
laLeitao(2010)   0.342 (2.96)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1993 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 22.06 
Leitao(2010)   0.146 (9.19)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1993 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 21.21 
Favara(2003) 0.612 (4.74)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.775 
Favara(2003) 0.407 (2.71)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.718 
Favara(2003) 0.331 (2.27)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.660 
Favara(2003) 0.301 (1.95)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.602 
Favara(2003)   0.389 (3.83)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.775 
Favara(2003)   0.244 (1.82)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.718 
Favara(2003)   0.215 (2.54)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.660 
Favara(2003)   0.198 (2.09)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.602 
Favara(2003) 0.709 (7.05)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.810 
Favara(2003) 0.257 (2.22)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.746 
Favara(2003) 0.427 (5.28)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.681 
Favara(2003) 0.582 (6.56)       1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.280 
Favara(2003)   0.545 (6.9)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8.185 
Favara(2003)   0.187 (2.23)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.483 
Favara(2003)   0.311 (5.91)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.280 
Favara(2003)   0.113 (1.92)     1 1 1 0 0 0 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7.681 
Favara(2003) 0.072 (10.9)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.84 
Favara(2003) 0.074 (2)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.84 
Favara(2003) 0.06 (7.25)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.82 
Favara(2003) 0.048 (0.91)       1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.82 
Favara(2003)   0.024 (7.32)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.84 
Favara(2003)   0.021 (0.83)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.84 
Favara(2003)   0.009 (4.18)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.82 
Favara(2003)   0.006 (0.29)     1 1 0 1 1 1 1979 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 22.82 
Kemal et al.(2008) 0.0017 (0.25)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1987 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 21.58 
Kemal et al.(2008) 0.0971 (1.25)       1 1 1 0 1 1 1987 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 21.56 
Kemal et al.(2008)   -0.012 (-2.8)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1987 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 21.58 
Kemal et al.(2008)   -0.010 (-1.5)     1 1 1 0 1 1 1987 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 21.56 
Barajas et al.(2010)      0.018 (4.266)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 11.53 
Barajas et al.(2010)      0.014 (2.697)     1 1 0 1 1 0 1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 11.40 
Gondo (2009)   0.086 (3.18)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.899 
Gondo (2009)   0.089 (3.06)     1 1 1 0 0 1 1985 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4.899 
A: Liquid Liabilities/GDP, B: Private Credit/GDP, C:Domestic Credit/GDP, D: Private/Domestic Credit, E: Dependent variable(1=GDP, 0=otherwise), F:Functional form(1=linear, 0=otherwise), G: 
Statistical technique1(1= least squares, 0=otherwise), H:Statistical  technique2(1=GMM, 0=otherwise), I:Type of analysis(1=panel, 0=otherwise), J: Frequency of data(1=annual, 0=otherwise), 
K:Years(average year of study period), L: Data transformation(1=log, 0=otherwise), M:Data transformation(1=variable/GDP, 0=otherwise), N:Africa(1=Africa, 0=otherwise), O:Asia(1=Asia, 
0=otherwise), P(1=Europe, 0=otherwise), Q:Latin America(1=Latin America, 0=otherwise), R: North America(1=North America, 0=otherwise), S:Southeast Asia(1=Southeast Asia, 0=otherwise), 
T(1=Middle East, 0=otherwise), U: World Bank information(1=Information from the World Bank, 0=otherwise), V: IMF information(1=IMF information, 0=otherwise), W:UN information(1=UN 
information, 0=otherwise), X: Size(Squared root of degrees of freedom). Values in brackets () after extrapolated coefficients are student statistics. 
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